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Abstract 
Practices that involve power dynamics are integral to maintaining organisational 
safety (e.g. speaking-up, challenging poor behaviour, admitting error, communicating on 
safety), and staff engagement in these is assumed to be shaped by perceptions of safety 
culture. These perceptions, in-turn, are associated with (1) positions within an organisational 
hierarchy (which makes power-related acts more or less threatening), and (2) societal values 
for power distance (e.g. challenging authority).  With a sample of 13,573 of air traffic control 
staff (controllers, engineers, administrative, and management) from 21 national air traffic 
providers, we reconfirm the observation that managers perceive safety culture more 
positively than frontline staff (hypothesis 1), and that workers in countries with established 
values for hierarchy and power report safety culture as less positive than those from countries 
with low power distance (hypothesis 2). We then, for the first time, examine the interaction 
between these two factors, and establish that differences in safety culture perceptions 
between those higher in the hierarchy (management) and those lower in the hierarchy (air 
traffic controllers and administrative staff) are exacerbated by national contexts for large 
power distance (hypothesis 3). The study contributes to the literature by theorising the role of 
power in safety culture theory, and its influence upon safety culture perceptions. Moving 
forward, safety culture research and interventions may benefit from considering how power 
exists and manifests at the level of superior-subordinate dynamics.  
 
Keywords: safety culture, power distance, national culture, values, organisational culture, 
hierarchy 
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Safety culture and power: Interactions between perceptions of safety culture, 
organisational hierarchy, and national culture  
 
‘Safety culture’ refers to shared attitudes, values and perceptions towards safety held 
by organisational groups, with it being that assumed that safety culture is both a product and 
driver of risk-related practices (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Cooper, 2000; Hale, 
2000; Pidgeon, 1998). The concept rose to prominence in the aftermath of the Chernobyl and 
Challenger accidents, and is used to characterise and measure psychological and behavioural 
characteristics of organisations that can lead to, or prevent, accidents. To this end, safety 
culture measurement, often conducted through employee surveys, is an integral part of 
organisational risk management in many industries (Choudhry et al., 2007; Flin, Mearns, 
O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) and is linked to changes in organisational 
policy and practice (DeJoy, 2005; Langford, Rowlinson, & Sawacha, 2000; Mannion, 
Konteh, & Davies, 2009). 
Perceptions of safety culture are measured because they are assumed to reflect 
organisational activities and policies on safety, and to predict safety-related behaviours, for 
example, adhering to safety rules, raising safety concerns to management, and reporting 
safety incidents. Yet, the extent to which perceptions of safety culture are predictive of 
accidents is unclear, with some studies indicating safety culture perceptions predict 
workplace injuries (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009), and other research showing 
employee survey responses taken prior to organizational accidents do not always align with 
factors attributed with causing the accident (e.g. pressure to not report safety concerns) 
(Antonsen, 2009b; Kvalheim, Antonsen, & Haugen, 2016). Nonetheless, it is generally 
assumed that where beliefs and activities in relation to safety are shared and positive, safety 
culture is considered ‘strong’, and to indicate a reduced likelihood of safety mishaps. 
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Conversely, fragmented and negative perceptions indicate a ‘weak’ safety culture, and 
increased susceptibility to accidents (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009) 
Yet, recent research indicates that perceptions of safety culture also reflect the 
structural and contextual features of an organisation, and not just institutional activities and 
policies on safety (Clarke, 1999; Findley, Smith, Gorski, & O’Neil, 2007; Hofstede, 1976; 
1980; 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; 
Parand et al., 2010; Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003; Thomas, Sexton, & Helmreich, 2003). 
More specifically, employee perceptions of safety culture are shaped by employee position 
within an organisation hierarchy (e.g. status), and the societal context within which an 
organisation is based (e.g. whether it is normal to challenge authority), with the role of power 
distance being central to both (Bahari & Clarke, 2013; Clarke, 1999; Findley et al., 2007; 
Hofstede, 1976; 1980; 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010; Li, Harris, & Chen, 2007; Lu, Lai, Lun, & 
Cheng, 2012; Mearns et al., 1998; Prussia et al., 2003; Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 
2015; Soeters & Boer, 2000). In particular, employees lower in the organisational hierarchy 
(i.e. with less power) often perceive activities core to safety culture (e.g. raising concerns, 
reporting errors) as less easy to engage in when compared to those further up the hierarchy 
(e.g. management) (Clarke, 1999; Findley et al., 2007; Mearns et al., 1998; Parand et al., 
2010; Prussia et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2003). Furthermore, in societies where there is a 
high power gradient between those with and without authority (i.e. with it not being normal 
to challenge those in high status roles), perceptions of safety culture tend to be less positive 
(particularly for practices such as incident reporting, Reader et al., 2015).  
In the current paper we examine how organisational hierarchy (organisational role) 
and societal values (national culture) related to power distance affect perceptions of safety 
culture. For the first time, we test the interaction of these two effects, the purpose being to 
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examine and parse out the multi-faceted influence of power upon perceptions of safety 
culture. We conduct this study within the European Air Traffic Management industry. 
National Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) work to direct aircraft during take-offs 
and landings, and expedite the flow of air traffic within and between countries. ATM is a 
highly standardised industry, and is especially suitable for studying interactions between 
occupational roles and national culture. In particular, the industry-wide requirement for a 
completely safe and reliable system, almost identical work practices internationally, 
standardisation of organisational roles, and nationally-bounded nature of ANSPs mean it is an 
especially well-placed industry through which to examine interactions between national 
culture and organisational characteristics. By examining this issue in ATM, we aim to 
contribute to the literature through conceptualising and empirically investigating how power 
distance shapes organisational safety culture.  
 
Safety culture and power  
Safety culture research often examines whether culture is a ‘leading indicator’ of 
safety, its distinction from safety climate, and the psychometric dimensions that characterise 
distinct forms of safety-related values and practices. In terms of safety performance, safety 
culture has been shown as a predictor of employee safety behaviours, and is weakly 
associated with employee safety incidents (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006). Cox and Flin 
(1998) describe the difference between safety culture and climate as akin to ‘personality and 
mood’, whereby culture refers to values, beliefs, and practices, and climate to perceptions of 
management commitment to safety. Both concepts are seen as to have a high overlap (e.g. 
due to their use of surveys), but culture is generally agreed to focus on a wider set of 
phenomena (e.g. incident reporting systems, organisational learning, communication, human 
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resources), and can be studied qualitatively and quantitatively (Mearns, Kirwan, Reader, & 
Jackson, 2013).  
Psychological study of safety culture has identified various dimensions of safety-
related values and practices important for managing risk (Mearns et al., 2013; Reader et al., 
2015). These include such dimensions as  management commitment to safety (management 
prioritisation of safety), collaborating for safety (group attitudes and activities for safety 
management), incident reporting (extent to which respondents believe it safe to report safety 
incidents), communication (whether staff are informed about safety-related issues), colleague 
commitment to safety (beliefs about the reliability of colleagues’ safety-related behaviour), 
and safety support (availability of resources and information for safety management). Further 
details are presented in Table 1. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
These dimensions can be assessed variously, but the most common methodology is 
surveys of employee perceptions of safety culture (Mearns et al., 2013). These are seen as 
important because they reflect how employees perceive and evaluate organisational policies, 
practices, priorities, and values on safety. Critically, employee perceptions of safety culture 
are assumed to influence safety behaviours (e.g. incident reporting), which compounds the 
culture (e.g. normalising a behaviour). Yet, in terms of developing a positive and shared 
safety culture, Antonsen (2009a) suggests that organisations rarely achieve consensus and 
harmony. This draws on the observation that culture is socially constructed (Frost, Moore, 
Louis, Lundberg, & Martin, 1991; Martin, 1992; Schein, 1992), and thus will not necessarily 
manifest the same nor have the same effect in different components or levels of an 
organisation. For example, different perspectives on organisational culture emerge due to the 
demarcation of organisational roles, conflicts over resources, and the exercise of power 
(Zaleznik, 1970).  
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In terms of safety culture, this indicates that employee perceptions of organisational 
policies, practices, and values for safety are likely to be shaped by the role of employees, 
their position within the organisational hierarchy (i.e. where individuals have higher or lower 
implied power based on their hierarchy position), and the broader social environment in 
which they are operating. In particular, power appears relevant. Power has been defined 
variously by psychology researchers. For example, many researchers describe power in terms 
of resource control (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2009); others 
consider power in terms of relational influence (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992). In 
either case, these are explicit theories of power with explicit measures. We consider power 
more implicitly in two forms: 1) that inferred from an individual’s position within a 
hierarchy, and 2) the concept of ‘power distance’. In particular, the concept of ‘power 
distance’ appears important, and is an underlying feature of many safety culture studies. This 
is because the practices that underpin a strong culture often involve an aspect of power, 
including challenging power (e.g. speaking-up to stop an unsafe act by a colleague), 
manoeuvring around power (e.g. anonymously reporting incidents involving those in 
authority), or communicating with those in power (e.g. on necessary improvements to safety 
systems) (Antonsen, 2012).  
Often such behaviours are expected to be enacted by frontline employees – who are 
positioned lower in organisational hierarchies, often lower status, and not in management 
roles (though see Crozier, 1964, who argues that front-line workers often bypass typical 
power structures via subject-matter expertise and organisation) – and case study analyses of 
industrial accidents often identify problems in power-related practices (e.g. communication 
and speaking-up between employees of different status) as a causal factor in mishaps. For 
example, in terms of aviation accidents where first officers have been unable to challenge the 
behaviour of captains (National Transportation Safety Board, 2000), medical errors where 
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nurses speaking-up to senior clinicians might have averted patient harm (Pronovost, Wu, & 
Sexton, 2004), and process safety failures where front-line technical staff have felt unable to 
raise safety problems with management due to fear of reprisals (Reader & O’Connor, 2014). 
Furthermore, within the safety culture literature, it has been repeatedly shown that acts 
related to power distance are integral to effective safety management, and are emblematic of 
a safe culture (Chiang & Pepper, 2006; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Liu & Liao, 
2013).  
Yet, and perhaps surprisingly given the assumed relationship with safety practices 
(e.g. speaking-up), the influence of power distance upon perceptions of safety culture remains 
relatively underexplored. Although a small body of research has examined how perceptions 
of safety culture are shaped by the status of organisational roles and societal tendencies for 
challenging authority, there has been relatively little formal conceptualisation or empirical 
examination of how these different factors interact to shape perceptions of safety culture. To 
further this, we outline our conceptualisation and research hypotheses below. 
 Hierarchy position and perceptions of safety culture. First, the research literature 
indicates that how safety culture-related practices are perceived and enacted upon can depend 
upon the power associated with one’s position in an organisation’s hierarchy. For example, in 
healthcare, it is shown that nurses are more likely than clinicians to report finding it difficult 
to speak up on problems with patient care, and these divergent perceptions are understood in 
terms of their differing roles and authority status (Thomas et al., 2003).  
Psychological research of safety culture shows that senior staff tend to view safety 
measures and risk more positively than junior staff (Mearns et al., 1998), that perceptions of 
safety management vary according to whether one is in a managerial, supervisory, or 
operational role (Clarke, 1999), and that managers have more positive perceptions of safety 
culture than frontline and support staff (Findley et al., 2007). Furthermore, safety culture is 
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poorest when manager and worker perceptions diverge (Prussia et al., 2003), with group 
differences potentially leading to organisational conflict, increased risk, and degraded safety 
performance (Findley et al., 2007). Prussia and colleagues (2003) suggested that such 
improvements required closer agreement between managers and workers over safety 
responsibility. 
In terms of explaining why those in different hierarchy positions perceive safety 
culture differently, various factors can be identified. For example, employees in positions of 
differing organisational hierarchy will likely differ in terms of knowledge and experience in 
the organisation, with frontline staff having access to first-hand safety information and 
management holding an organisation-wide view on safety. Indeed, an individuals’ role and 
position within a hierarchy shapes how they construe and communicate about events, with 
those higher-up in hierarchies using more abstract and positive language, compared to those 
lower in the hierarchy using more concrete and negative language (Magee, Milliken, & Lurie, 
2010). Furthermore, there are many safety practices that involve social risks (e.g. speaking 
up), which may lead those in less powerful positions (i.e. placed lower in the organisational 
hierarchy) to view such practices as more challenging. For example, engaging in voice acts is 
easier for those in senior rather than junior roles (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Islam & Zyphur, 
2005; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006), and where there is a large authority gradient between 
superiors and subordinates, communication between superiors and subordinates becomes 
asymmetrical due to the differences in status, with the stream of information flowing top-
down rather than bottom-up (Cosby & Croskerry, 2004).  
When viewpoints on safety differ in such a way, and are not communicated due to 
hierarchical boundaries, divergences in perceptions of safety culture may emerge. For 
example, if frontline staff are given less opportunity to speak up and challenge superiors, then 
they may feel less engaged with incident reporting. Where subordinates believe that 
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management’s communication on safety issues is too abstract, it may be perceived as 
insufficient. Furthermore, if subordinates feel that their superiors do not listen to their safety 
concerns, then they will perceive management to have less commitment to safety. Indeed, 
interventions to improve safety-related practices often focus on reducing power distances 
between senior and junior staff in order to improve communication processes. For example, 
training leaders to encourage junior team members to speak-up (Edmondson, 2003), using 
resources to increase collaboration in inter-disciplinary teams (Levina & Vaast, 2008), and 
ensuring leader inclusiveness (defined as words and deeds by a leader or leaders that indicate 
an invitation and appreciation for others’ contributions) in order to improve psychological 
safety and engagement (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  
Thus, our first hypothesis intends to confirm the observation that hierarchical position 
(and power entwined within that position) is associated with more or less positive perceptions 
of safety culture. We suppose that, in the current research setting, those in more higher 
hierarchical positions (managers) will perceive safety culture more positively because they 
are less threatened by engaging in safety practices (e.g. reporting), and by virtue of their 
position in the organisational hierarchy will have more information on organizational efforts 
to improve safety, but less knowledge about the specific challenges being faced by staff. 
However, those positioned lower in the hierarchy (air traffic controllers, engineering staff, 
administrative staff) will perceive safety culture less positively due to the challenges with 
engaging in safety practices (e.g. speaking-up), alongside greater awareness of the specific 
safety challenges being experienced ‘on-the-ground’ (and the absence of management 
action).  
H1: Those positioned higher in a hierarchy (managers), and with the power associated 
with that position, will view safety culture more positively than those positioned 
lower in the hierarchy (frontline staff). 
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 National values for power distance and safety culture. Second, psychological 
research of safety culture has shown that societal values for power distance can shape 
perceptions of safety culture for organisations operating in different geographical regions 
(Reader et al., 2015). At a societal level, the notion of power distance is conceptualised as a 
dimension of culture that can vary between nations. Specifically, studies of national culture 
have isolated several dimensions by which national culture vary. Hofstede and colleagues 
(Hofstede, 1976; 1980; 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010) have famously spent several years 
documenting cultural dimensions, of which power distance is one. National power distance 
specifically refers to how national, cultural and educational institutions shape shared values 
and behaviour with respect to the way nation-members think of and approach hierarchies and 
power in interpersonal contexts. National power distance is about nation-members 
expectations regarding the symmetry of relations, and is measured by Hofstede’s Power 
Distance Index, where high scores reflect greater distance between superiors and 
subordinates and greater acceptance of hierarchy, whereas low scores reflect less distance and 
less acceptance of hierarchy.  
In terms of theorising safety culture, national variations in power distance appear 
important. Nations are a key unit of shared experience due to their educational and cultural 
institutions that shape the values of its members (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011). Thus, national 
values for large power distances may influence perceptions of safety culture through shaping 
the willingness of those in less powerful positions to challenge authority and correct errors 
made by superiors, reducing the likelihood that junior staff will admit mistakes that have 
potential social or career-related consequences, and creating asymmetrical communication 
between management and subordinates (Mearns & Yule, 2009; Reason, 2016; Soeters & 
Boer, 2000).  
RUNNING HEAD: Safety culture and power 
 11 
The research evidence indicates safety culture is shaped by national values related to 
power distance. Research into organisational accidents, for example aircraft crashes, has 
indicated both a qualitative and statistical association between national values for power 
distance (usually operationalised in terms of flight crews challenging captains) and accidents 
(Helmreich, 1994; Li et al., 2007; Soeters & Boer, 2000). Furthermore, in considering the 
difficulties of applying safety climate models developed with Western samples, Bahari and 
Clarke (2013) have considered the influence of strong power distance values upon 
observations of safety climate. Also, associations have been observed between respondents’ 
low power distance perceptions and reduced human failures in container shipping operations 
(Lu et al., 2012), and European geographical regions with strong power distance values have 
been shown to have less positive perceptions of safety culture in the Air Traffic Management 
industry (Reader et al., 2015).  
Although strong power distance has been found with more positive perceptions of 
safety culture (Håvold, 2007), the weight of evidence indicates that national power distance is 
negatively related to safety (Bahari & Clarke, 2013; Li et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2012; Reader et 
al., 2015; Soeters & Boer, 2000). We suppose that strong power distance values are likely to 
influence safety culture through discouraging challenges to authority, reducing 
communication on safety, limiting opportunities to innovate on safety, and our second 
hypothesis seeks to reconfirm the observation that national cultural values will shape safety 
perceptions. Emulating the observation that power distance values in different European 
regions interact with safety culture in the ATM industry (Reader et al., 2015), we examine 
whether ANSPs in European societies with strong power distance values have less favourable 
perceptions of safety culture.   
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H2: National values for power distance will be negatively related to safety culture 
perceptions, such that as national values for power distance become stronger, safety 
culture perceptions will become more negative. 
 
 The interaction of power’s manifestations. The practices that characterise a strong 
safety culture often involve power dynamics (e.g. challenging, negotiation, communication), 
and the previous hypotheses assume that engagement in these is influenced by employee 
perceptions of safety culture, which is in-turn influenced by 1) position within a hierarchy, 
and 2) national values for power distance. We examine the interaction between the latter two 
manifestations of power in order to understand how perceptions of safety culture are a 
product of organisational structures and societal values outside specific organisational 
policies, regulations, and institutional rules for safety. This is both important for 
understanding how power distance potentially shapes how safety is enacted within an 
organisation, and for considering how organisational and social structures shape safety 
culture development.  
To date, there has been no examination of the interaction between the two 
manifestations of power examined in this study: the power associated with one’s hierarchical 
position, and the societal values for how they enact that power. This interaction can 
potentially take two forms. First, national values for power distance are likely to reduce the 
quality of communication across a hierarchy (e.g. for challenging unsafe acts, raising safety 
concerns, reporting safety incidents), and therefore potentially exacerbate the divergence in 
safety culture perceptions between those higher and lower in organisational hierarchies 
because they will further reduce the sharing of perspectives and information on safety. In this 
first form, differences between superiors and subordinates will be greater in nations with 
strong power distance values and weaker in nations with weak power distance values. 
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Second, strong power distance values may actually have the potential to improve the quality 
of communication across a hierarchy through clarifying lines of communication (e.g. clearly 
stating expectations for incident reporting, developing systems for reporting information). If 
this is the case, the gap between superiors and subordinates for perceptions of safety culture 
will be smaller in nations with strong power distance values.  
Although the evidence base for building a hypothesis is limited, we believe that the 
assumption of a main effect of national culture is more logical. This is because even if strong 
power distance values do clarify lines of communication, broader issues around concerns 
over challenging superiors, blame, meeting the expectations of managers (which may cause 
conflict), and responding to unanticipated situations are unlikely to be entirely negated. 
Consistent with Erez and Gati’s model (2004), we expect national values for power distance 
to augment the greater power associated with a higher position in a hierarchy, and the 
reduced power for those in front-line roles, which shapes perceptions of safety culture.  
H3: National power distance values will moderate the manager-frontline staff gap in 
safety culture perceptions, such that safety culture perceptions of management and 
frontline staff will be most aligned at low levels of national power distance, and less 
aligned at high levels of national power distance. 
Theoretical and practical relevance 
The research questions posed have both theoretical and practical implications. On the 
theoretical implications, they speak to the development of safety culture. Specifically, it is 
supposed that power is not only central to the practices that are emblematic of safety culture 
(i.e. speaking-up behaviors), but also how people construe and construct the power dynamics 
that surround those practices. This indicates that safety culture is not just a product of 
institutional policies, safety management systems, and group dynamics, but also of more 
macro-level factors relating to power dynamics within institutions and broader societal 
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values. This is critical to understanding how safety culture develops and can be influenced, 
and connects to the long-standing debate around the relationship between micro and macro-
level determinants of organizational culture (Molloy, Ployhart, & Wright, 2010) and the 
application of construal level theory to organisational research (Wiesenfeld, Reyt, Brockner, 
& Trope, 2017).  
It is also important at a practical level, particularly for understanding how safety 
culture develops, is measured, and changes in societies with different values around power, 
and different hierarchical structures. To examine this, our study focuses on the European 
ATM industry, which is especially suitable for testing hypothesis 3 due to industry wide 
standardisation of working practices, nationally-bounded companies, occupational roles, 
regulation, policies, and requirement for a completely safe and reliable system. 
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Method 
Participants 
The participant data used in the current study originates from an ongoing research 
project to measure and monitor safety culture in the European Air Traffic Management 
industry. The project has run since 2006 and is coordinated and funded by EUROCONTROL 
(the organisation for coordinating and planning European air traffic management). Over this 
period, more than 30 countries have been involved in the project, with over 20,000 
participants in total. As such, the dataset is large, and questions about the interaction between 
national culture and safety culture can be examined. For example, whether a safety culture 
model can be used reliably across international contexts (Reader et al., 2015), and whether 
safety culture benchmarking should take into account national values for uncertainty 
avoidance (Noort, Reader, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2015). In this paper we draw on a dataset of 
13,616 ANSP employees based in 21 ANSPs, across 21 European countries (one ANSP per 
country). Survey responses were collected between 2011 and 2015 via online surveys. We do 
not include data prior to this because of significant changes to the survey instrument (Mearns 
et al., 2013). For purposes of data transparency, Appendix 1 reports on the two other studies 
utilising an overlapping data set.   
In the current study, we report on the data from 13,616 respondents. Of those, 1,592 
(12%) reported ‘manager’ as their primary role, 6,500 (48%) reported ‘controller’ (or other 
operations staff), 1,764 (13%) reported ‘engineer’, and 3,717 (27%) reported being 
administrative staff (or other staff). We include responses administrative and other non-
operations staff in our analyses because safety culture permeates all aspects of the 
organisation (e.g. decisions taken in the HR department may have implications for the ways 
frontline staff work). Some respondents reported having no primary role (n = 43) and were 
not included in the analyses, bringing the final sample size to 13,573 (staff demographics 
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presented in Table 2). There was an average of 649 responses (SD = 682.07) from each of the 
ANSPs, for an average response rate of 55% across 17 ANSPs (unfortunately we do not have 
response rate data for four sites). We opt to withhold descriptive data on the specific 
nationalities of our respondents as it would be possible to infer the specific ANSP, 
compromising the organisation’s anonymity (e.g. many nations have a single ANSP). In 
order to preserve the interests of the organisations involved, and our subsequent working 
relationships with those organisations, we withhold nationality data and do not present safety 
culture data paired with organisational descriptive data.  
<INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
Measures 
Safety culture. Recent work (Reader et al., 2015) demonstrated the psychometric 
properties of a safety culture questionnaire tool for European ATM. The survey was 
developed as part of a multiple method approach (literature review, interviews, focus groups, 
incident analyses), where preliminary data collected with early versions of the tool were 
subject to exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Mearns et al., 2013). The survey 
items cover a large range of safety culture issues specific to ATM, and the six underlying 
dimensions iterate well established themes within the safety culture literature more generally 
(management commitment to safety, collaboration for safety, incident reporting, 
communication, colleague commitment to safety, and safety support). After further testing 
and refinement, the final model identified six dimensions of safety culture relevant to ATM 
across Europe (management commitment to safety, collaboration for safety, incident 
reporting, communication, colleague commitment to safety, and safety support; see Table 1). 
The current version of the safety culture questionnaire tool comprises 19 Likert items (1: 
strongly disagree; 5: strongly agree). A safety culture score is calculated by averaging 
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participants’ scores on each of the six safety culture dimensions, where higher scores 
represent more positive perceptions of safety culture within the organisation.  
Hierarchical position. We consider individual power through hierarchies and by 
studying occupational roles, which we assume manifest power phenomena. Our survey 
collects information about what respondents consider to be their primary role. Responses to 
this item are coded as one of four possibilities: (1) managers; (2) controllers (and other 
operations staff); (3) engineers; or (4) administrative staff. This breakdown allows us to 
compare differences in perceptions between managers (implicit higher power) and three 
different groups comprising frontline staff (implicit lower power). Coding is decided by 
either consulting the organisation’s survey representative or, where the survey representative 
was unavailable, by relying on expert controller knowledge regarding job role terminology. 
National power distance. We consulted Hofstede’s Power Distance Index (PDI; 
Hofstede et al., 2010) and assigned participants a power distance score based on the nation in 
which they primarily work. It is important to note here that participants may have national 
cultural origins that are distinct from the PDI value assigned to them (participants were not 
asked their national cultural background for reasons of anonymity and brevity). The PDI 
measures the extent to which power differences within society and societal institutions 
(organisations, family units, etc.) are accepted by less powerful members.  
Hofstede uses four questions to calculate the PDI that can be found in the 2013 
version of the Values Survey Model (Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, & Vinken, 2013). The 
first two ask respondents how important it is for them to have a boss (direct superior) they 
can respect, and for them to be consulted by their boss in decisions involving their work 
(items 2 and 7 respectively; 1: of utmost importance, 5: of very little or no importance). The 
third asks respondents how often subordinates are afraid to contradict their boss (item 20; 1: 
never, 5: always). The final asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with 
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the statement that an organisation structure in which subordinates have two bosses should be 
avoided at all cost (item 23; 1: strongly agree, 5: strongly disagree). The PDI is then 
calculated using the following formula 
PDI = 35(m07 – m02) + 25(m20 – m23) + C(pd) 
In the formula, m02 is the mean score for item 02, etc., and C(pd) is a constant 
(positive or negative) that depends on the nature of the samples. The index usually has a 
range of about 100 points. The four power distance items were found to load on onto a 
common factor related to issues of power and inequality. 
These items, along with many others, were part of employee opinion surveys at the 
multinational firm, IBM. The value in this dataset comes from a combination of two things: 
(1) that responses are from approximately 50 different national sites around the world, and 
(2) the respondents were well matched on several dimensions (i.e. work, SES, family life) 
that makes national comparisons quite clear. The above formula was applied to responses in 
the IBM dataset, allowing a rank-ordering of nations based on their inhabitants’ average 
responses to the PDI questions (Hofstede et al., 2010). We assign these PDI values to 
participants based on the nation they primarily work in.  
Procedure 
All data were collected via online surveys, except at seven smaller sites where paper-
based surveys were used. Surveys were organised by EUROCONTROL in partnership with 
the management in each ANSP, with the survey data being collected by the study authors. 
Participants reported basic information about their work (organisational department, 
occupational role, location), before answering questions about the organisation’s safety 
culture. Study results were reported back through a report and series of focus groups in each 
institution. Ethical clearance was granted by the ethics board at the London School of 
Economics. The nature of our data is sensitive for both individuals recording their 
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perceptions within an organisation, and the organisations themselves. To ensure their 
anonymity we do not record demographic details (e.g. age, gender) as these alone can be 
enough to identify some participants. We could report such data as an average, but we have 
found participants sometimes prefer to not fill out the survey when questions like these are 
included. We also do not report on the demographic detail of the ANSPs (e.g. organisational 
size, national context) as, again, this could be enough to compromise the organisation’s 
identity. 
Data Analysis 
 Bayesian statistics. Calculating Bayes factors allows for clearer interpretation of null 
results. With traditional null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), a p-value gives the 
probability of the data occurring if the null hypothesis was true; that is, how often the data 
occur by chance if there was no effect in the first place. We should not, however, assume a 
non-significant result counts as evidence for the null (as much as we sometimes like to). Or 
more simply, we should not confuse ‘absence of evidence’ with ‘evidence of absence’ 
(Heather, 2014). A Bayes factor, however, represents the weight of evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis vs. the null hypothesis. Thus, while NHST allows two possible 
conclusions (reject the null or there is insufficient evidence to reject the null), a Bayesian 
perspective allows three: 1) there is strong evidence for the alternative; 2) there is strong 
evidence for the null; 3) the data are insensitive with respect to the null and alternate 
hypotheses. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses will often show considerable agreement in 
interpretation, except in the case of null results - frequentist statistics cannot allow for 
meaningful interpretation of null results, whereas Bayesian statistics can.  
Bayesian linear regressions allow us to say how many times better a particular model 
accounts for the data against a comparison model by evaluating the relative size of each 
models’ Bayes factor. In this case, we are interested in the relative change in performance 
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that a model including interaction terms has over a model without (see Etz, 2015). Thus, each 
section reports the overall amount of variance accounted for by the model (conventional 
linear regression), relative performance of the model (Bayesian linear regression), and 
parameter estimates. 
Analysis plan. We conducted linear multiple regression to determine the amount of 
variance in safety culture perceptions accounted for by the full model and the individual 
predictors. For this regression, we simultaneously entered hierarchy position (testing H1), 
national power distance (testing H2), and the interaction term (testing H3). We also 
calculated a Bayesian linear multiple regression with the same predictors so that we could 
compare the relative performances of variations in the model. Finally, we conducted simple 
slopes analyses to examine the effect of national power distance values on each level of the 
hierarchy position variable, that is, on each of managers, controllers, engineers, and 
administrative staff.  
Preliminary analyses. Here we report preliminary analyses ahead of the focal 
analyses. Both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality determined the 
distribution of safety culture scores was normally distributed (K-S statistic (df=12) = .193, p 
=.200; S-W statistic (df=12) = .954, p = .699). As this is a very large dataset, the ability for 
any one observation to influence the regression analysis is low. Consequently, all 
observations have a Cook’s Distance score below .002, suggesting no observations were 
particularly influential. Visual inspection of the P-P plot for standardized residuals revealed a 
linear relationship between the predictors and the outcome. The correlation between power 
distance and hierarchy position was not large enough to violate the multicollinearity 
assumption (r = .087, p < .001). Of potential concern, however, was that the predictors were 
more strongly correlated with each other (r = .087) than with the dependent variable 
(hierarchy position: r = -.037; power distance: r = -.047). Multicollinearity often occurs when 
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two independent predictors actually tap the same latent construct. It is difficult, however, to 
interpret this multicollinearity because it is unclear how national power distance and 
hierarchical position would tap into a similar latent construct. 
 
Results 
Moderation analysis 
All analyses were conducted in R. To test our moderation analyses, we conducted 
both conventional linear regressions and Bayesian linear regressions via the BayesFactor 
package (v0.9.12-2, Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015).  
We entered hierarchy position, national values for power distance, and interaction 
terms as predictors, with safety culture as the outcome variable, for all regressions. We 
describe this as the full model. The organisational role variable was dummy coded with the 
manager category as the reference. Thus, there were three dummy coded hierarchy position 
variables: managers vs. controllers, managers vs. engineers, and managers vs. admin staff.  
Hypothesis 1. Hierarchy position accounted for a significant amount of variance in the 
full model. Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported. Each dummy coded variable was a significant 
predictor in the model, with controllers (b = -.240, p < .001), engineers (b = -.405, p < .001), 
and administrative staff (b = - .212, p < .001) all having lower perceptions of safety culture 
than managers. A model with the group factor only performed BF10 = 4.71 x 1082 (±0%) 
times better than an intercept-only model at explaining the data. The probability density 
distributions for each organisational role is visually represented by violin plots in Figure 1. 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
Hypothesis 2. National power distance values also accounted for a significant amount 
of variance in the full model (b = -.006, p < .001), supporting hypothesis 2. That is, safety 
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culture appeared to diminish with increasing amounts of power distance scores. A model with 
the power distance variable only performed BF10 = 7.15 x 1072 (±0.01%) times better than an 
intercept-only model but was the poorest performing predictor compared to all other models. 
A power distance only model performed BF10 = 6.59 x 109 (±0.01%) times poorer than an 
organisational role-only model, BF10 = 1.78 x 1089 (±2.25%) times poorer than a main 
effects-only model (a model including both the organisational role and power distance 
variables), and BF10 = 2.46 x 10101 (±0.69%) times poorer than a full model (including the 
interaction). The main effect of power distance is represented visually in Figure 2.  
<INSERT FIGURE 2 APPOXIMATELY HERE> 
Hypothesis 3. The data analysis indicated support for Hypothesis 3, for which we 
were interested in the relative performance of a full model, including the interaction terms, 
compared to a main-effects only model. The main effects model accounted for a significant 
amount of variance, R2 = .056, F(4, 13,564) = 199.40, p < .001, as did the full model, R2 = 
.061, F(7, 13,561) = 125.50, p < .001. There was a significant increase in variance accounted 
for by including the interaction term, R2ch = .005, F(3, 13,651) = 25.52, p < .001. 
Specifically, the interaction terms for the managers vs. controllers and managers vs. 
engineers were significant (controllers: b = -.024, p = .017; engineers: b = .006, p < .001), 
whereas the interaction term for administrative staff was not significant (b = <.001, p = .970). 
In Bayesian model comparison, the full model performs BF10 = 1.37 x 1012 (±2.25%) times 
better than a main effects-only model. Indeed, the full model was the best performing model 
configuration. The interaction is visually represented in Figure 3 and regression coefficients 
are provided in Table 3. 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
<INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
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Simple slopes. We examined the simple slopes of power distance values on safety 
culture for each level of the hierarchy position variable. The safety culture perceptions of 
managers (b = -.006, t = -6.97, p < .001), controllers (b = -.008, t = -15.22, p < .001), and 
administrative staff (b = -.006, t = -11.28, p < .001) were all negatively affected by increasing 
national power distance values. Interestingly, engineers appear unaffected by national power 
distance values, as their levels of safety culture perceptions were constant across all levels of 
power distance (b < .001, t = -.057, p = .954).  
Exploratory analyses. Visual inspection of the results led us to question whether the 
interaction was driven solely by the engineers, whose safety culture perception seem almost 
entirely unaffected by national values for power distance. To check for this, we removed 
engineers from the sample and re-ran the model comparison for the full model vs. the main 
effects-only model. 
With the engineers removed, the main effects model accounted for a significant 
amount of variance, R2 = .062, F(3, 11,801) = 261.80, p < .001, as did the full model, R2 = 
.063, F(5, 11,799) = 159.90, p < .001. As with the sample including the engineers, the 
interaction term led to a significant increase in variance, R2ch = .001, F(2, 11,799) = 6.68, p = 
.001. While the interaction term was significant according to conventional frequentist 
methods, Bayesian model comparison suggests the main effects model actually performed 
comparably, only performing nominally better than the full model by BF10 = 1.19 times 
(±2.38%). Thus, the influence of the interaction is substantially reduced once engineers have 
been removed from the sample. The interaction term for the controllers was again significant 
(b = -.002, t = -2.35, p = .019), where the slope for the controllers was steeper than for 
managers, suggesting that controllers’ safety culture perceptions are more affected by power 
distance. The interaction term for the administrative staff was not significant, suggesting that 
the effect of national values for power distance on administrative staff’s safety culture 
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perceptions were not significantly different to safety culture perceptions reported by 
managers. Regression coefficients for the analyses without engineers are presented in Table 
4. 
<INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 
 
Discussion 
Summary of findings 
Our approach to power distance in safety culture is informed by the observation that 
many safety acts and practices inevitably involve the navigation of power dynamics, and that 
perceptions of safety culture shape how people engage in these behaviours. Yet, these 
perceptions in-turn were hypothesised to be influenced by the power distances between levels 
in organisational hierarchies (Hypothesis 1), and national differences in approaching power 
differentials and hierarchy (Hypothesis 2). These are elements not typically included in 
assessments of safety culture, and our analysis supported both hypotheses, which is 
consistent with past research. We then, for the first time, examined the interaction between 
these effects in order to establish whether nations with greater power distance values also 
have greater divergences in perceptions of safety culture between levels of hierarchy 
(Hypothesis 3).  
We interpret our data as showing that the effect of an individual’s position within an 
organisational hierarchy has on their safety culture perceptions is moderated by the extent to 
which hierarchies are nationally normative. The gap in safety culture perceptions between 
management and frontline staff, while existing at low levels of national power distance for 
some organisational group comparisons, is greatest at high levels of power distance, 
especially for engineers and controllers (but not administrative staff).  
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Theoretical implications 
The data reported in this manuscript align with multi-level conceptualisations of 
culture (Erez & Gati, 2004). According to Erez and Gati (2004), culture is both multilevel 
and dynamic, with proximal levels of culture providing context for each other through both 
top-down and bottom-up processes. They propose a cultural hierarchy, with organisational 
culture nested within national culture. We suppose this creates variations in how safety 
culture is perceived and understood within an organisation, with hierarchies and power 
distance increasing ‘differentiation’ and ‘fragmentation’ in safety culture, whereby multiple 
interpretations arise according to factors such as identity, professional role, and interactions 
with others (Martin, 1992). Our work, for the first time, reveals that variations in how 
organisational culture is viewed can be attributed to an interaction between internal (i.e. 
organisational hierarchy) and external (i.e. national) factors.  
 Indeed, our results demonstrate the value in considering the different levels of 
organisational culture through which power operates. We show that national values for power 
distance are more relevant for controllers than they are for engineers, and that they have a 
more negative effect on controllers’ safety culture perceptions than managers and 
administrative staff. Thus, the interaction of national power distance and power derived by 
position within an organisation appears important for how safety culture perceptions emerge 
for the different organisational roles. Yet, although we cannot directly test a multi-level 
conceptualisation with the data available (see limitations section below), multi-level 
conceptualisations of culture do not provide guidance on how to consider the multiple 
cultural forces acting on an individual. The nested nature of Erez and Gati’s model suggests 
simply that adjacent levels of culture interact, without describing the individual’s experience 
of those cultures. For example, the extent to which national culture can influence individuals 
may be called into question given its relatively small effect size in comparison to that of the 
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hierarchy position variable. This latter variable might be considered more proximal and 
salient to employees, with one’s organisational role having a greater impact upon perceptions 
of safety culture than characteristics associated with national culture. 
One approach that can inform on this issue is a social identity approach (Haslam, 
2004; Postmes & Branscombe, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This is used to consider and 
explore values and behaviours (i.e. culture) arising from multiple group memberships. Social 
identity theory posits that individuals’ values, values, and behaviours are determined by the 
extent to which individuals internalise their meaningful group memberships: for example, a 
professional role or national identity. The impact of any given level of culture in a hierarchy 
might depend on the individual’s level of identification with that cultural group. Obviously, 
the workers in our sample appear to be managing multiple group memberships at once. 
Where a social identity perspective would be useful is in accounting for the individual 
differences within groups. Thus, we believe there is value in future work marrying together 
cultural dimensions theory with social identity approaches in order to fully understand the 
effect of culture on individuals. 
Theoretical data guiding practical understanding  
An unexpected finding was that engineers were mostly unaffected by national cultural 
values for power distance. That is, once we removed the engineers from the sample the effect 
of the interaction terms was reduced, though still significant. A Bayesian comparison of the 
relative performance of the main effects-only model with the full, interactive model showed 
that the two models performed comparably. Thus, the inclusion of the interaction terms, 
while accounting for significantly more variance, seems to add little interpretational value, 
especially considering the large sample size.  
The results for the engineers forced us to consider why they seemed at odds with the 
managers, controllers, and admin staff, who all displayed a negative relationship between 
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their safety culture perceptions and national power distance. We informally presented these 
data to other ATM workers (including engineers) and asked if they could help us understand 
why engineers seemed unaffected by national values for power distance. One anecdote was 
offered several times and happens to fit well with the theory. Several workers suggested that 
engineers are unaffected by national values for power distance because they are usually the 
subject matter experts, meaning they often work independently from their immediate 
supervisor. Whereas controllers are often supervised by other controllers or former 
controllers who know the job intimately, the supervisors of engineers might have little 
specific knowledge for how a particular system should operate. If managers must defer to 
engineers because engineers are the subject matter experts, then there is less opportunity for 
power distance and hierarchies to affect engineers. While these anecdotes do not constitute 
scientific evidence, they do provide both a platform by which to interpret our data, and a 
direction with which to pursue further research. If true, the above speculation only highlights 
the need to consider a multi-method approach when conducting organisational research to 
best capture the unique perceptions of culture that arise from the interaction of organisational 
structures and national cultures.  
While the above suggestions are speculative, there are some results in the 
management literature of the 1980s that lend support to the notion. For example, levels of 
autonomy and goal congruence are more important for engineers (and scientific personnel) 
than other staff in explaining rates of retention (Sherman, 1989). Engineering managers must 
motivate their workforce toward innovative results, which may lead to an unstructured 
organisational environment (Thamhain, 1983). Indeed, a key concern for managers of 
engineers has historically been the simultaneous regulation of engineers’ autonomy and 
control in order to promote innovation, while still producing measurable and effective 
outcomes (Feldman, 1989). So, it remains feasible that, where engineers’ work requires 
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creativity and innovation, managers of engineers may be more ‘hands-off’ than managers of 
other workers, whose work requires less creativity. Beyond this, our data show that engineers 
have a different relationship with their organisations than frontline staff. Indeed, the 
characteristics of engineers’ work, or how they are positioned appear to show a separate 
cultural layer for engineers. Indeed, Crozier’s conceptualisation of power in The 
Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964) highlights how control of uncertainty, skills, or knowledge 
by lower ranked workers can bypass typical power hierarchies. This is an important principle 
for understanding safety (or organisational) culture more broadly, in that much of safety-
critical work happens away from the frontline. It may be that there are groups working in 
other safety-critical industries that share characteristics of engineers (e.g. work 
characteristics, position within the organisation), which would reveal much about the 
organisation’s culture. This becomes especially important when considering that 
characteristics of engineers’ work appear to override national cultural effects.  
Practical implications 
Our research demonstrates that a one-size-fits-all approach to safety culture is 
insufficient, in that neither hierarchy positions nor national culture wholly explain the 
variance in safety culture perceptions. It is only through examining how national cultural 
contexts influence the power dynamics of an organisation that a full understanding of 
organisational culture can be captured. Indeed, our results demonstrate that national culture 
appears to differentially affect different organisational roles, with controllers being the most 
affected, managers and administrative staff similarly affected, and engineers unaffected. This 
highlights the need for any organisational interventions targeting power to take into account 
the various ways in which different organisational roles interact with their superiors. As 
mentioned above, we have learned since running our analyses that engineers might have 
greater freedom for self-guided work and might have less interaction with their supervisors 
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than controllers do. The extent to which a superior and subordinate interact would then 
necessarily be important when evaluating effects of national cultural values for power 
distance – if there is little interaction then there is little opportunity for power to affect the 
subordinate. Thus, future safety culture interventions would do well to consider the existing 
values and protocols between superiors and subordinates to account for existing power 
dynamics relating to safety behaviours. 
Limitations and future directions 
A number of limitations require discussion. Much of our thinking about power 
distance and its effect on safety culture relies on the assumption that power distance creates 
asymmetrical communication flows. We speculate that communication is bi-directional 
between management and frontline staff in weak power distance contexts, but becomes uni-
directional in strong power distance contexts because management takes limited input from 
frontline staff. Indeed, there are several large-scale international surveys about the 
relationship between culture (e.g. shared values) and manager-subordinate relationships 
(Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002; Smith, Peterson, Thomason, The Event Meaning 
Management Research Group, 2011; Van de Vliert & Smith, 2004). Yet, we did not 
investigate specific relationships, and did not include any measure of communication flow (or 
capture behaviours), principally because it was outside the scope of the project when it 
began. To examine this further, a logical first step would be to establish experimentally that 
power and hierarchies creates an asymmetry of communication, which itself leads to 
diverging perceptions between levels of the hierarchy. 
A further limitation of this work is that it fails to take into account the dynamic nature 
of social identities. We have shown evidence for cultural effects on organisational 
perceptions but what would be most interesting would be a comparative study of social 
identities (e.g. national identities, organisational identities, job-role identities), documenting 
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how salient each is (e.g. the extent to which controllers primarily identify as controllers), and 
how predictive they are of safety culture perceptions. This work would greatly contribute to 
the understanding of culture as a superordinate entity above group-level dynamics. Mixed 
effects (or multilevel) modelling would greatly aid the interpretation of such a study. In our 
case, an ideal mixed effect model would have entered hierarchy position and national power 
distance as fixed effects, then allowed the effect of national power distance on safety culture 
to vary (random slope of national power distance) according to levels of the ANSP variable 
(random intercept of ANSP). Unfortunately, due to the organisation of ANSPs across Europe, 
there is usually only one ANSP per nation, meaning that our national power distance and 
ANSP variables are essentially transforms of each other and the above described model does 
not make sense.  
Finally, the nature of our data may be problematic in two ways. First, the data are 
cross-sectional and can result in bias in the outcome measures. This is a particular problem 
when the characteristics of missing data differ from non-missing data. Indeed, the reasons for 
missing data in surveys of safety culture are potentially highly enlightening. Second, the self-
report nature of our safety culture survey is a limitation of our study because of social 
desirability, common method bias, lack of predictive ability, and potential minimal 
participant insight on the issues being examined. Nonetheless, self-report remains an essential 
component of how safety culture is psychologically measured, as employee espoused values 
and knowledge on safety are an integral element of culture, and surveys allow for the large-
scale collection of these. In particular, for issues such as power, perceptions of power-related 
practices are integral to the phenomena being investigated, however alternative (e.g. more 
behavioural) measures might also have been incorporated and associated with survey data. 
For example, incident reporting data, communications data, procedures for supporting staff to 
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raise safety concerns, and behavioural observations are perhaps more indicative of the 
underlying assumptions around poor culture, and the acts that demonstrated it (Schein, 1992).  
Conclusions 
For the first time, we have demonstrated that safety culture perceptions are affected 
by the interaction of national values for power distance and power conferred by position 
within a hierarchy. This contributes to the literature by theorising the role of power in safety 
culture theory, and examining how it manifests and potentially determines safety culture. It 
highlights the importance of considering how power exists and manifests at the level of 
superior-subordinate dynamics when assessing and attempting to change organisational 
safety culture. 
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Appendix: Data transparency table 
Data transparency table. 
  
Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & 
Kirwan, 2015 
Noort, Reader, Shorrock, & 
Kirwan, 2016 
Current manuscript 
17 European countries 21 European countries 21 European countries 
10,717 respondents 13,616 respondents (additional 
2,899) 
13,616 respondents 
Primarily reported at regional 
level 
Reported at the de-identified 
ANSP (country) level 
Reported at occupation level 
(managers, controllers, engineers, 
admin), at de-identified ANSP 
(country) level, and at the 
interaction level. 
Distinguishes between managers 
and controllers 
Reports data collated across all 
workers 
Distinguishes between managers, 
controllers, engineers, admin 
Uses 6-factor safety culture model Uses 6-factor safety culture model Uses 6-factor safety culture model 
Uses Hofstede 5-factor model to 
link national culture with safety 
culture, and to test for regional 
differences in safety culture. 
Uses single Hofstede factor 
(uncertainty avoidance) to test 
benchmarking technique. 
Uses single Hofstede factor 
(power distance) to understand the 
role of power in safety culture 
research. 
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Table 1. 
Safety culture dimensions for European Air Traffic Management (ATM). Reproduced from Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan (2015). 
Dimension Definition Relevance for Safety Management Example Questionnaire Items 
Management commitment 
to safety 
Extent to which management 
prioritize safety 
Indicates organisational 
prioritization of safety within an 
ANSP 
• My manager is committed to safety 
• My manager takes action on the safety issues we raise 
• My manager would always support me if I had a concern about safety 
 
Collaborating for safety Group attitudes and activities 
for safety management 
Indicates normative behaviours 
and attitudes among ANSP staff 
toward safety 
• Other people in this organisation understand how my job contributes to 
safety 
• People who raise safety issues are seen as troublemakers 
• There are people who I do not want to work with because of their negative 
attitude to safety 
• My involvement in safety activities is sufficient 
 
Incident reporting Extent to which respondents 
believe it is safe to report safety 
incidents 
Essential for identifying system 
weaknesses and learning 
• People who report safety related occurrences are treated in a just and fair 
manner 
• Voicing concerns about safety is encouraged 
• We get timely feedback on the safety issues we raise 
 
Communication Extent to which staff are 
informed about safety-related 
issues in the ATM system 
Important for ensuring staff are 
aware of system changes that 
might shape safety-related 
activities 
• Information about safety related changes within this organisation is 
clearly communicated to staff 
• We learn lessons from safety related incident or occurrence investigations 
• I have good access to information regarding safety incidents or 
occurrences within the organisation 
• There is good communication up and down the organisation about safety 
 
Colleague commitment to 
safety 
Beliefs about the reliability of 
colleagues’ safety-related 
behaviour 
Highlights reliability of ANSP 
staff for engaging in safety 
activities 
• Everyone I work with in this organisation feels that safety is their personal 
responsibility 
• I have confidence in the people that I interact with in mu normal working 
situation 
• My colleagues are committed to safety 
 
Safety support Availability of resources and 
information for safety 
management 
Indicates active support within the 
institution for maintaining safety 
• We have sufficient staff to do our work safely 
• People in this organisation share safety related information 
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Table 2.  
Demographics of staff across 21 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). Reproduced from Noort, Reader, 
Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2016. 
ANSP Managers Controllers Engineers Administrative 
Total (role 
missing) 
1 128 1258 270 419 2075 
2 29 311 45 131 516 
3 11 47 27 44 129 
4 13 105 18 41 177 
5 416 536 78 583 1613 
6 41 319 35 315 710 
7 58 172 146 127 503 
8 22 83 31 62 198 
9 9 128 24 30 191 
10 35 71 71 15 192 (3) 
11 10 71 11 2 94 (5) 
12 36 361 83 36 516 (35) 
13 244 904 290 678 2116 
14 46 252 74 100 472 
15 30 86 31 30 177 
16 9 48 16 50 123 
17 21 91 63 151 326 
18 39 226 51 76 392 
19 42 379 0 113 534 
20 72 231 55 107 465 
21 281 821 345 607 2054 
 
1592 6500 1764 3717 13573 (43) 
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Table 3. 
Full model vs. main effects model regressions with full sample. 
  Coefficient t p 
Full model Constant 4.062 82.403 <.001 
 Power distance -0.006 -6.140 <.001 
 Managers vs. Controllers (D1) -0.241 -4.407 <.001 
 Managers vs. Engineers (D2) -0.405 -6.137 <.001 
 Managers vs. Admin staff (D3) -0.211 -3.631 <.001 
 Power distance * D1 -0.002 -2.380 .017 
 Power distance * D2 0.006 4.576 <.001 
 Power distance * D3 <.001 0.038 .967 
 Model: R2 = .061, F(7, 13561) = 125.50, p < .001 
 Interaction: R2ch = .005, F(3, 13,561) = 25.52, p < .001   
Main effects model Constant 4.078 175.32 <.001 
 Power distance -0.006 -19.46 <.001 
 Managers vs. Controllers (D1) -0.360 -18.50 <.001 
 Managers vs. Engineers (D2) -0.123 -5.13 <.001 
 Managers vs. Admin staff (D3) -0.209 -10.07 <.001 
 Model: R2 = .055, F(4, 13,564) = 199.40, p < .001 
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Table 4. 
Full model vs. main effects model regressions with engineers excluded. 
  Coefficient t p 
Full model Constant 4.062 81.384 <.001 
 Power distance -0.006 -6.064 <.001 
 Managers vs. Controllers (D1) -0.241 -4.352 <.001 
 Managers vs. Admin staff (D2) -0.212 -3.586 <.001 
 Power distance -0.006 -6.064 <.001 
 Power distance * D1 -0.002 -2.350 .019 
 Power distance * D2 <.001 0.038 .970 
 Model: R2 = .063, F(5, 11799) = 159.90, p < .001 
 Interaction: R2ch = .001, F(2, 11,799) = 6.68, p = .001  
Main effects model Constant 4.128 169.553 <.001 
 Power distance -0.007 -20.805 <.001 
 Managers vs. Controllers (D1) -0.361 -18.375 <.001 
 Managers vs. Admin staff (D2) -0.210 -9.992 <.001 
 Model: R2 = .062, F(3, 11,801) = 261.80, p < .001Power distance 
-0.007 
-20.805 
<.001 
 Model: R2 = .062, F(3, 11,801) = 261.80, p < .001 
 
  
Formatted Table
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Figure 1. Violin with box plots demonstrating the main effect of hierarchy position on safety 
culture perceptions. Violin plots are probability density distributions. Boxplots show 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles, inter-quartile range, and mean (represented by white circle) safety 
culture scores. 
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Figure 2. Main effect of national power distance on safety culture. X-axis values are 
increasing from left to right. Specific x-axis values are not included to maintain anonymity of 
the organisations that we work with. 
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Figure 3. The interactive effect of hierarchy position and national power distance on safety 
culture perceptions. A. Managers. B. Controllers. C. Engineers. D. Administrative staff. 
Specific x-axis values are not included to maintain the anonymity of the organisations we 
work with. 
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Figure List. 
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